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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT TO BAIL UPON REVIEW
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
INTRODUCTION
Upon review the right of a convicted person to enlargement on
the condition of giving security for his presence arises from the
principles and practice of the common law as implemented by the
criminal rules promulgated for the federal courts. After conviction,
the right to bail is discretionary, while before trial it is mandatory
except in capital cases.' It is the purpose here to review the condi-
tions imposed by rule and decision on the right to bail upon review.
The leading case of Hudson v. Parker,2 decided under the first
declaration by the Supreme Court of the common law rule,3 defines
the nature of the right as permissive rather than absolute. The reason
for allowing a person his freedom not only before trial, but also after
conviction is found in the reluctance to compel anyone to undergo
punishment, "until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court of
last resort. ' 4 This is the underlying theory of the present law.5
Upon review appellants have a right, not to bail per se, but "to the
exercise of the fair judicial discretion of the judges . . . in deciding
their application."6 The granting of bail is not "a matter of grace or
favor.' 7 The problem presented by an application for bail, pending
appeal, is clearly stated by Justice Butler in his capacity as Seventh
Circuit Justice in United States v. Motlow.8 The decision on the appli-
cation is to be primarily conditioned on the character of the appeal.
It is not to be determined on "the merits of the case."9 Factors to be
considered to this end are the nature of the case, the trial and the
assignment of errors. The nature of the crime charged or "the prob-
able guilt or innocence"' 0 of the applicant are not germane to the
issue on application for bail, pending appeal. The purpose to which
judicial discretion is to be exercised in the granting or withholding of
bail is "to discourage review sought, not with hope of a new trial, but
' Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), opinion of Jackson, J.
2 156 U.S. 277 (1895).
3 Rule 36(2), 139 U.S. 706 (1891). Text: Where such writ of error is allowed
in the case of a conviction of an infamous crime... the Circuit Court or Dis-
trict Court, or any Justice or Judge thereof, shall have power, after the cita-
tion is served, to admit the accused to bail in such amount as may be fixed.4 Supra, note 2 at 285.
5 This quotation from the case is frequently cited. Recent cases which refer to
it are Bryson v. United States, 223 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Yanish v. Barber,
73 S.Ct. 1105 (1953) ; Stack v. Boyle, supra, note 1.
6 Rossi v. United States, 11 F.2d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1926).
7 United States v. Motlow, 10 F2d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 1926).8 Supra, note 7.
' Ibid. at 663.
1 oIbid. at 662.
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on frivolous grounds, merely for delay."'11 Factors other than the
frivolity of the appeal and delay in its prosecution that have been
considered material to the determination by the courts have been
the likelihood of escape which might be implied from the character
of the defendant and the nature of the offense charged,12 as well as
the possibility of a repetition of the crime charged by the applicant
while at large.' 3
While the conditions governing the right to bail upon review have
not been questioned, serious concern has been expressed over the
extended liberty enjoyed by persons convicted of crime, pending
appeal.' 4 This contributed to an attempt at a more precise definition
of the conditions on which bail might be granted in Rule VI of the
Criminal Appeals Rules," effective in 1934. Incidental to this restate-
ment of the existing law, the burden of proving the substantiality of
the appeal was apparently shifted to the applicant.' 6 The existence of
a substantial question to be determined on appeal was a prerequisite,
but not the only factor that conditioned the decision on the application.
Bail was denied in United States v. Delaney'7 because the appeal
lacked substantiality. But the applicant had been indicted with an-
other for the same offense and had voluntarily disappeared until after
the trial of the other. Such conduct, the court indicates, would have
been sufficient had there been some doubts as to the probabilities of.
reversal, to resolve them in favor of the government.
RULE 46 (A) (2), FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Application for bail upon review is now made under Rule 46(a) (2)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,"' which provides as
follows:
"Bail may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari only if it
appears that the case involves a substantial question which
should be determined by the appellate court. Bail may be allowed
by the trial judge or by the appellate court or by any judge
thereof or by the circuit justice. The court or the judge allowing
11 Ibid. at 663.
"2 United States v. Motlow, supra, note 7; Rossi v. United States, supra, note 6.
"3Rossi v. United States, supra, note 6; United States ex rel. Estabrook v.
Otis, 18 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1927).
1 4 United States v. Delaney, 8 F.Supp. 224 (D.N.J. 1934).
15Ruit VI, CRIMINAL APPEALS RuLES, 28 U.S.C.A. §723 (a) (1934). Text:
Bail. The defendant shall not be admitted to bail pending an appeal from
a judgment of conviction save as follows: Bail may be granted by the trial
judge or by the appellate court, or where the appellate court is not in session,
by any judge thereof, or by the circuit justice.
Bail shall not be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that the appeal
involves a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate
court.
16 United States v. Delaney, supra, note 14.
17 Ibid.
28 FED. RuLEs CR. Paoc. RuLE 46(a) (2), 18 U.S.C.A. (1952).
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bail may at any time revoke the order admitting the defendant
to bail."
The Rule substantially restates the existing law except that the pro-
visions to bail pending certiorari and the right of revocation are new.'19
The language of the Rule as well as the expressed intent of its framers
indicates adherence to established principles governing this subject.
The use of the word "may" was deliberate. It was substituted for
the proposed "shall" on the recommendation of Chief Justice Stone.20
As before, the applicant is not entitled to bail as of right on the pre-
sumption that the conviction is correct. He has, however, the right to
apply for bail. Where there is a substantial question to be determined
on the appeal, the approval of the application remains within judicial
discretion.
SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION
Generally, the only issue presented by an application for bail under
Rule 46(a) (2) is the substantiality of the appeal. What constitutes
substantiality has in itself been considered a substantial question.2 '
It requires something less than a showing that applicants are entitled
to a reversal.2 2 Substantiality may be found in questions "on which
unbiased, learned and intelligent students of law might reasonably
differ."23
Phrases used to describe questions that are deemed substantial are
"fairly debatable", 24 "not yet decided by that court", 25 and "fairly
doubtful . . . not trivial or merely technical, but (having) substantial
importance to the merits. ' ' 2r This issue has been considered by Justice
Douglas in his capacity as Ninth Circuit Justice. He declares that this
condition of Rule 46(a)(2) is met by questions "new and novel",
presenting "unique facts not plainly covered by the controlling prece-
dents", or involving "important questions concerning the scope and
meaning of decisions of the Supreme Court. ' 27 In a recent case
Justice Douglas held a question to be substantial where "there is a
contrariety of views concerning it in the several circuits.' 2 He also
states that a substantial question within the meaning of the Rule is
19BARRON AND HOLTZHOFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, Vol. 4, §2503(1951).20 Williamson v. United States, 184 F2d 280, n. 281 (2nd Cir. 1950). Justice
Jackson here quotes excerpts from the unpublished history of Rule 46 (a) (2)
in the files of that Court.
21 Herzog v. United States, 75 S.Ct. 349 (1955).22 United States v. Motlow, supra, note 7.2 3 United States v. Delaney, supra, note 14.24 United States v. Warring, 16 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D.Md. 1954); United States
v. Stephenson, 110 F.Supp. 623, 627 (D.Alaska 1953); D'Aquino v. United
States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1950).2 5 United States v. Barbeau, 92 F.Supp. 196, 202 (D.Alaska 1950).
26 Williamson v. United States, supra, note 20 at n. 281.
27 D'Aquino v. United States, supra, note 24, at 272.
28 Herzog v. United States, supra, note 21.
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presented where the appellate court should give directions to its dis-
trict judges on the question, or "if in the interests of the administra-
tion of justice some clarification of an existing rule should be made. '29
He describes how the conclusion as to substantiality is reached by an
analogy to the procedure before the Supreme Court upon application
for writs of certiorari. In looking to the soundness of the errors
alleged, the judge or justice takes into consideration "whether there
is a school of thought, a technical argument, an analogy, an appeal
to precedent or to reason commanding respect that might possibly
prevail." 30 For the purpose of the Rule it is sufficient that "one judge
would be likely to see merit in the contention. ' '31
The purpose of the requirement of a substantial question to be
determined on appeal is to absolutely deny bail where the appeal has
no merit and is frivolous. However, when the court which will hear
the appeal on the merits determines the application for bail, its deci-
sion is not to be taken as a prejudging of the issues of the appeal. 32
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Although no serious controversy as to the general interpretation
of Rule 46(a) (2) had arisen prior to 1950, four cases decided that
year were thought to indicate conflict or at least varying trends in its
application in different circuits. 33 This has importance beyond the
question of possible conflict because it concerns the problem of the
exercise of judicial discretion in the granting or denial of bail upon
review after a conclusion as to the substantiality of the appeal has
been reached. To determine whether there is actual conflict these cases
should be considered in the light of the character and conduct of the
applicants, the nature of the offense charged, as well as the decisions
and reasoning.
In D'Aquino v. United States,3 4 the applicant "Tokyo Rose" had
been convicted of treason. Justice Douglas granted bail on the ground
that the appeal presented a substantial question. He further stated
that where it may be shown that an applicant though guilty beyond
doubt "may have been denied the kind of trial that even a traitor to
our country is entitled to under the Constitution and laws"3 bail
should be granted. The application was approved subject to "provi-
291d. at 351.
30 Id. at 351.
31 Id. at 351.
32 United States v. Iacullo, 225 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1955).
33 The possibility of conflict was discussed by a number of student writers.
See the following: Bail, pending appeal, mandatory or discretionary? 1 CATH.
U. L. REv. 93-9 (1950); Federal Criminal Procedure-granting of bail after
conviction, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 191-7 (1951); 64 HARv. L. REv. 662-4 (1951);
37 VA. L. REv. 447-9 (1951).3 Supra, note 24.
35 Id. at 272.
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sions safeguarding the interests of the United States against dilatory
tactics."36
In United States v. Burgman,3 7 where the applicant had also been
convicted of treason, Judge Holtzhoff, one of the framers of Rule
46(a) (2) finds two conditions imposed thereby. First, the appeal must
present a substantial question, and second, the case must be one in
which in the exercise of judicial discretion it would be proper to grant
bail. Bail was denied in this case because the appeal was found to
embody no substantial question and also for the reason that it would
not be proper to grant bail after conviction where it had been denied
before trial. That treason is not an extraditable offense was con-
sidered as relevant to securing the presence of the applicant. The
D'Aquino case was held not applicable because there substantiality
of the appeal was found.
A similar interpretation as to the conditions imposed by the Rule
is followed in the Second Circuit decision of Williamson v. United
States.38 This was an application to Justice Jackson for an extension
of bail after the Court of Appeals had revoked bail but allowed a
temporary extension pending the application to the Justice. The revo-
cation was grounded on the improper conduct of the applicants. Bail
was granted for the reason that the ground of the revocation did not
remove the substantiality of the appeal which had been conceded
originally by the government. The decision is, however, primarily
concerned with the second of the conditions defined in the Burgman
case. Justice Jackson finds a limited discretion as to the determina-
tion of the propriety of granting or denial of bail where the first condi-
tion is met. Here the post-conviction activities of the applicants,
making speeches and writing articles which were found not to contain
any advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government, were held
not to warrant denial. A caution as to the exercise of the power of
judicial discretion is expressed, namely that it not be used to "coerce
men to forego conduct as to which the Bill of Rights leaves them
free," 39 nor to imprison persons for "predicted but as yet unconsum-
mated crimes."40 This would indicate that the commission of a crime,
or grave and imminent danger resulting from the enlargement of
the applicant may be such factors as in themselves warrant denial.
Bridges v. United States4 is concerned with issues similar to those
of the Williamson case. The applicant filed a motion in the Court of
3r Id. at 272.
37 89 F.Supp. 288 (D.C. 1950).
38Supra, note 20.
39 Id. at 283.
40 Id. at 282.
41184 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1950). In this case notice of appeal was filed July
1950, and the appeal decided against the applicant. This was reversed by the
Supreme Court in 345 U.S. 979 (1953). As a later case, Bryson v. United
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Appeals to modify or vacate an order by the trial court revoking bail.
Concluding that the revocation proceedings had not disturbed the
findings as to substantiality, the Court granted bail. No suggestion was
found that the applicant might escape or not prosecute his appeal. As
to the post-conviction activities of this controversial labor leader in
following the Communist position during the Korean situation, the
Court held that these did not warrant denial since no crime had been
committed thereby. Here, as well as in the previous case, concern
was expressed for the effect of subjecting an accused Communist to
the punishment of imprisonment pending appeal of his conviction.
The following sentence of the opinion, however, was thought to raise
the question whether the court held the granting of bail to be manda-
tory on the finding of substantiality: "But where a meritorious ques-
tion exists, bail becomes a matter of right, not of grace. '42
May it then be said on the basis of these four cases that the Ninth
Circuit decisions, i.e. D'Aquino and Bridges interpret Rule 46(a) (2)
as imposing only the conditions of substantiality of the appeal and
making the granting of bail mandatory on this being met, while the
other Circuits hold this to be a condition precedent to the exercise of
judicial discretion as to the propriety of granting bail? It is submitted
that, in the light of the definition of the Rule stated in the Burgman
case, there is no apparent conflict as to the conditions imposed there-
by on the right to bail upon review, nor is there conflict as to estab-
lished principles governing this right. In each case, the primary con-
cern is for the substantiality of the appeal, the first condition to be
met. Where this is found to exist, bail is granted; where lacking, bail
is denied. Each case looks to the propriety of granting bail under
the circumstances of the case. Justice Douglas disposes of this ques-
tion by making the grant conditional to a diligent prosecution of the
appeal. In the Williamson and Bridges cases, where the conduct of the
applicants gave rise to the question of propriety of allowing the en-
largement of the applicants, it is held that where a substantial question
existed to be determined on appeal, the particular conduct of these
applicants although certainly controversial did not constitute grounds
for denial. In the absence of any indication by the court in the Burg-
man case as to what would have been the result had a substantial ques-
tion been found, the difference of opinion as to the bailability of the
offense of treason after conviction between this case and the D'Aquino
case might be reconciled within the subjective latitude of judicial dis-
cretion. The supposedly controversial sentence of the Bridges case
appears less so in the light of the almost identical language of earlier
States, 223 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1955), points out, if bail had been denied here,




decisions defining the nature of the right of an applicant to bail upon
review, which are cited in the opinion.4 3
More recent decisions which deal with the problem of judicial
discretion, after a conclusion had been reached as to the substanti-
ality of the appeal, appear consistent with the application of the Rule
in these cases. In Christoffel v. United States,44 active participation
in Communist party affairs was held not to constitute sufficient grounds
for denial of bail where the appeal presented a substantial question.
Bail was denied in United States v. Glazer4 5 where the applicant had
been convicted of income tax evasion because it was not shown that
the appeal was substantial, "or, that in the court's discretion defendant
should be admitted to bail pending appeal." 46 The court does not elab-
orate, however, what gave rise to the denial on the second, disjunctive
ground. In Yanish v. United States,47 Justice Douglas holds that the
applicant's membership in the Communist Party and his work for a
Communist paper did not warrant denial since he had no previous
criminal record and such activities constituted no danger to the com-
munity. In another decision" by Justice Douglas, where the appli-
cant had been convicted of income tax evasion, it is noted that there
is no likelihood of his escape. One recent Ninth Circuit decision,
Johnson v. United States, 9 in which the majority and dissenting
opinions agree that denial is warranted for lack of substantiality,
there is also agreement that "this court has never had in mind that
Rule 46(a) (2) is a mandate for the general allowance of bail on
appeal." 50 Similarly, a Seventh Circuit decision, United States v.
Iacullo,5' after reiterating that the granting of bail rests in sound
judicial discretion and cannot be demanded as a matter of right, adds
"nor does the presence of a substantial question make bail manda-
tory.' 52
It should be noted that a number of cases5" considered the likeli-
hood of escape a factor next in importance to frivolity and delay in
determining the application, and generally fixed the amount and terms
of bail on standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence
of the defendant. This suggests some overlapping of the discretion-
ary power as to granting or denial and the determination of the
43 Rossi v. United States, supra, note 6; United States v. Motlow, supra, note 7.
4196 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
45 14 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.Mo. 1952).
46 Id. at 90.
4773 S.Ct. 1105 (1953).
4 8Herzog v. United States, supra, note 21.
49 218 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1954).
50 Id., dissent on other grounds, at 580.
51225 F2d 458 (7th Cir. 1955).
52 Id. at
5 3 Herzog v. United States, supra, note 21; Rossi v. United States, supra, note
6; United States v. Motlow, supra, note 7; Hudson v. Parker, supra, note 2.
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amount and the terms on which bail might be granted. Rule 46(c)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" states that where bail
is granted it shall be in such amount as "will insure the presence
of the defendant." Among factors listed as material to the determi-
nation of this amount are "the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged" and "the character of the defendant." This provision has
been held to apply to bail before as well as after trial.5 5 The danger
of escape, however, is considered a "calculated risk", one "which the
law takes as a price of our system of justice." 56 The word "insure"
in this section has been interpreted to mean "assure. '57 In United States
v. Barker,58 where the applicant had been convicted of mail fraud
and criminal contempt, the court found no substantiality as to the
appeal from the latter conviction, and the applicant had to serve this
sentence. However, the appeal from the mail fraud conviction was
found not to be frivolous, and bail was granted thereon. That "the
defendant may be a security risk" and his "calculated and studied
contempt" 59 together with the affidavit of his previous bondsman that
he intended to flee made it essential that bail be fixed in a substantial
amount. Where the amount of bail set by the trial court had the effect
of keeping the applicant in jail because he was unable to raise the
required amount, $50,000 in this instance, the appellate court in Bryson
v. United States60 ordered this reduced. In view of the substantiality
of the appeal, and the facts that the applicant had no prior record of
any criminal offense and that there was no danger of flight, the court
felt that keeping the applicant in jail under these circumstances would
be in "complete disregard of the principle established by the Supreme
Court in the case of Hudson v. Parker."'
PROCEDURE UNDER RULE 46(a) (2) AFTER DENIAL By TRIAL COURT
A number of recent decisions raise another question with respect
to Rule 46(a) (2), namely, whether the application to the appellate
court, or a judge thereof, or to the circuit justice is in the nature of a
trial de novo. The principle that the ruling of the trial judge "is not
54 FED. RULES CR. PROC. RULE 46(c), 18 U.S.C.A. (1952). Text: If the de-
fendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as in the judg-
ment of the commissioner or court or judge or justice will insure the
presence of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of
the offense charged, the weight of evidence against him, the financial ability
of the defendant to give bail, and the character of the defendant.
55 Bryson v. United States, 223 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1955).
56 Stack v. Boyle, supra, note 1 at 8.
57 United States v. Schneidermann, 102 F.Supp. 52, 73 (S.D.Cal. 1951). (reversed
on other grounds.)
58 11 F.R.D. 421 (N.D.Cal. 1951).
59 Id. at 423.
60 Supra, note 55.
61 Id. at 777.
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and should not be final" 62 appears from the language of the Rule, as
well as that of earlier provisions. It should be noted here, that, under
Rule 38(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,63 which
must be read in conjunction with Rule 46 (a) (2), it must now be
shown that application to the court below either was not practicable,
or that it has been made and denied, stating the reasons for denial. It
would appear from a number of cases that such application is in the
nature of a trial de novo, not only from the frequency with which
denial by a trial court was reversed, but also from the express state-
ments by judges and justices in determining such applications. Justice
Butler states that denial by the trial court and two judges of the appel-
late court should be "considered thoughtfully" 64 but not be allowed to
control a just exercise of discretion in determining the application. In
the Rossi case the appellate court found an "imperative duty"6 5, to
exercise its own discretion. Justice Douglas, after giving "deference"
to the judgments of the courts below, held that where doubts remain,
the justice "alone must resolve them." 66 In Carlisle v. Landon67 it
is stated that in determining the motion for bail pending appeal, the
appellate court is not "reviewing as for correction or errors, the action
taken by the district court, but is considering whether the applicant
is presently entitled to be enlarged upon bail.
' 68
Two recent decisions by Justice Frankfurter as Second Circuit
Justice appear to point to a different policy. In Albanese v. United
States69 bail was denied on the ground that the petition could not be
granted unless the record revealed a clear abuse of discretion by the
appellate court in denying bail, even though the questions sought to be
raised on appeal were not frivolous. It is indicated, however, that a
renewal of the application would be entertained if delay in the prose-
cution of the appeal might be ascribed to the government. In Patter-
62 Proceedings of Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D.
243 (1946).
63 FED. RULES Cu. Puoc. Rurx 38(c), 18 U.S.C.A. (1952). Text: "Application
for Relief Pending Review. If application is made to a court of appeals or to
a circuit judge or justice of the Supreme Court for bail pending appeal or
for an extension of time for filing the record on appeal or for any other
relief which might have been granted by the district court, the application
shall be upon notice and shall show that application has been made and
denied, with the reason given for denial, or that the action on the application
did not afford the relief to which the applicant considers himself to be
entitled."
64 United States v. Motlow, supra, note 7 at 663.
65 Rossi v. United States, supra, note 6 at 265.
66 Herzog v. United States, supra, note 21 at 350.
67206 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1953). This was a proceeding upon a motion for bail
pending appeal from the District Court's judgment denying the relator a
writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it did not have the power to
enlarge the relator on bail.68 Id. at 193.
6975 S.Ct. 211 (1954).
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son v. United States,70 on the assumption that the appeal would be
heard as promptly as possible, bail was denied on the ground that the
Justice would have to find an abuse of discretion to reverse the finding
of the Court of Appeals. Another case, Johnson v. United States,7'
should be noted here. This particularly emphasizes that the question
of substantiality should be determined on the whole record of the
case when this is considered by the appellate court, although here the
lack of substantiality was so patent that bail was denied on that ground,
and not for the reason that the whole record was not before the
court. This requirement does not appear from the language of Rule
38(c), nor was it noted in prior cases.
The reason underlying the policy of these latter decisions may be
found in the persistent concern with what has been termed "the
spectacle of convicted defendants at large on bail, pending unnecessary
delays on appeal. ' ' 72 This concern is also revealed in what Judge
Holtzhoff considers one of the purposes of the previous law of which
Rule 46(a) (2) is a restatement, namely "the restriction of the en-
largement of convicted defendants on bail. '7 3 This concept would
seem to narrow the scope of the exercise of judicial discretion as
understood by Justice Butler.7 4
While this new policy is probably not intended to impair estab-
lished principles governing the right to bail upon review, nevertheless,
some consequences of its application may possibly constitute a water-
ing down of these principles. Denial of bail because of delays in the
prosecution of the appeal, regardless of its substantiality, would seem
to increase the possibility that the applicant might have to serve at least
part of his sentence even though his conviction were reversed on
appeal.75 Furthermore, denial of bail where the sentence imposed
on conviction is short, may render nugatory the right of appeal. Un-
doubtedly, this policy would have the desired effect of moving the
applicant to pursue his appeal with expeditiousness. Whether it would
result also in the expedition of the federal criminal appellate proce-
dure, the slowness and cumbersomeness of which are admittedly simi-
larly responsible for the lengthy enlargements of convicted defendants
and the frequent reversals of denials of bail" is not so certain. It may
perhaps be questioned whether the remedy for this serious problem
7075 S.Ct. 256 (1954). Here the conviction was reversed on appeal in United
States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (1955).
71 Supra, note 48. A similar approach is followed in United States v. lacullo,
supra, note 31.
72 United States v. Delaney, supra, note 14, at 227. The Court quotes from an
article by Chief Justice Hughes in BAR Ass'x. J., June 1934.
'13 United States v. Burgiman, supra, note 36 at 289.
-1 United States v. Motlow, supra, note 7.
75 See note 70.
76United States v. Fiala, 102 F.Supp. 899 (W.D.Wash. 1951); YANKWICH,
Release on Bond by Trial and Appellate Courts, 7 F.R.D. 271 (1947).
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lies in further restriction of the conditions on which bail may be
granted where, as the dissent in the Johnson case says it results in
"the cutting into human rights."7 7
SUMMARY
The generally accepted interpretation of the present law under
Rule 46(a)(2) imposes the following conditions on the right to bail
upon review. First, it must be shown that the applicant is honestly
pursuing legal means to obtain a reversal of his conviction by proving
the substantiality of his appeal. This is an absolute prerequisite to the
granting of bail. Second, it must be shown that the case is one in
which in judicial discretion it is proper to allow the enlargement of
the applicant with regard to the danger of flight or delay in the prose-
cution of the appeal, as well as danger to the community resulting
from the applicant's post-conviction activities.
The development of the rules implementing the common law
principles governing the right to bail upon review reflects a balancing
of two interests, that of the individual not to be unjustly imprisoned,
and that of society to see speedy justice done. There appears a shift-
ing emphasis in the end to which judicial discretion is exercised from
the protection of the interest of the individual to that of the public.
This emphasis appears more pronounced in some decisions than in
others. However, there does not seem to be any real conflict as to the
application of the present Rule, nor as to the underlying principles of
the right to bail upon review.
MARIA LumrTz
7 7 Johnson v. United States, sicpra, note 48 at 580.
1956]
